Officials in charge of arms control from the United States and China held a "rare" nuclear dialogue in Washington on Monday (November 6th). However, former US nuclear arms control experts told VOA that this US China nuclear dialogue should only be a "preliminary discussion", believing that it is not realistic for the US China to initiate nuclear arms control negotiations and reach a nuclear arms control treaty from then on.
As of the time of publication by Voice of America, neither party has made any statement regarding this conversation. In response to VOA's e-mail inquiry Monday afternoon, the State Council said that this was part of "more bilateral consultations" between Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Yi and US Secretary of State Antony Blinken when they visited Washington at the end of October, with the aim of "maintaining open communication channels with China on various issues and managing competition responsibly". The talks were chaired by Mallory Stewart, Assistant Secretary of State for Arms Control at the US State Department, and Sun Xiaobo, Director of the Arms Control Department of the Chinese Ministry of Foreign Affairs.

Why talk now?
The statement from the US State Department also did not provide an agenda or relevant details for the talks. Just saying, "The United States continues to call on China to substantially participate in arms control issues and reduce strategic risks. This engagement is a continuation of the United States' efforts to responsibly manage US China relations and ensure that competition does not escalate into conflict
However, on November 1st, the Wall Street Journal quoted a US official as saying that this meeting will be the first official discussion on the issue between the US and China since the Obama administration, and the two sides will focus on how to reduce the risk of miscalculation. The United States hopes to understand China's nuclear expansion, nuclear strategic thinking, and strategic stability concepts. Chinese Foreign Ministry spokesperson Wang Wenbin stated on November 6th that the two sides will engage in dialogue and exchange on a wide range of topics such as the implementation of international arms control treaties and non-proliferation.
Henrik St Å lhane Hiim, director of the International Security Center at the Norwegian Institute for Defense Studies, which has studied China's nuclear strategy and arms control issues for many years, believes that while this is part of China's broader efforts to improve and stabilize relations with the United States, do not place too much hope in China.
He said, "We should not have too high expectations for the outcome of this meeting or for China's long-term arms control stance. However, the ongoing communication between the two sides is commendable. At a time of heightened tension, if the United States and China can reach an agreement on measures to intentionally reduce risk reduction at some stage, it would be very welcome news
Suyash Desai, a Chinese national defense and foreign policy researcher currently studying at National Sun Yat sen University in Taiwan, told VOA that China's current agreement to nuclear negotiations may be due to concerns about its own security difficulties, in addition to paving the way for the "Baixi Conference".
However, he believes that although China has not indicated that this nuclear dialogue will lead to the initiation of nuclear arms control negotiations, But it may open the door for many future such meetings: "China's goal is to assure the United States that its strategic nuclear expansion is not targeting any country. Currently, China's nuclear expansion has led to confusion among American colleagues about China's nuclear strategic thinking, and this dialogue may be aimed at resolving this confusion to avoid any subconscious reactions from American counterparts
What are we talking about?
The Norwegian Defense Research Institute believes that given the United States' great concern about China's nuclear arsenal construction, the two sides may discuss topics such as improving transparency in nuclear strategic thinking and crisis communication.
The US Pentagon released a report on China's military strength last month. The report states that as of May this year, China has over 500 combat nuclear warheads, and is likely to deploy over 1000 nuclear warheads by 2030, reaching 1500 by 2035.
China's 2002 National Defense White Paper stated that "maintaining a lean and effective nuclear counterattack force is to contain potential nuclear attacks by other countries against China.  
Robert Peters, a nuclear deterrence and missile defense researcher at the Defense Center of the Heritage Foundation in Washington, D.C., predicts that within a decade, China's nuclear arsenal is likely to be on par with the United States in terms of quantity. This is an astonishing development. China is the fastest-growing nuclear power on Earth. It is currently unclear whether China will stop once it reaches a nuclear balance with the United States
In addition, China's nuclear policy is opaque, nuclear often intertwined (the interaction between nuclear and non nuclear fields), and may shift to a high alert mode based on Launch on Warning. The US is concerned that the Chinese government may deviate from the minimum deterrence posture, lower the threshold for the use of nuclear weapons, and seek to preemptively use nuclear weapons in conventional warfare.
Peters believes that China has recently introduced additional restrictions on its "no first use policy", specifying when it may be forced to use nuclear weapons first in conflicts, all of which indicate that China is deviating from a policy. He said, "China has every right to abandon this policy. But what China says is the opposite, which is dishonest
He explained that although the United States has not announced that it will not be the first to use nuclear weapons, its missile markings are very clear, regarding which types of nuclear weapons and high explosives are carried, and will be loaded by different types of ships and aircraft.
To be frank, China will not manufacture 100 nuclear weapons annually unless it plans to have at least the option of using nuclear weapons first. China is building stealth bombers (which are essentially replicas of the US B-2 stealth bombers) The H-20, which has nuclear capability, can throw nuclear bombs or launch nuclear ballistic or cruise missiles. China is deploying missiles with both nuclear and conventional capabilities on mobile launchers, covering the east coast of China and targeting areas from Japan, Taiwan, Guam to Australia and between. We cannot distinguish which missiles are loaded with conventional or nuclear warheads Peters said.
Peters said that for China, its agenda may include hopes of obstructing US missile defense in the Western Pacific, such as South Korea's "THAAD", Japan's "land-based Aegis", and the deployment of anti missile systems on Guam and potential US territory, as well as weakening the US's "nuclear umbrella" in Japan, South Korea, and Australia, as well as the possibility of South Korea moving towards "nuclear sharing".
China has always been concerned that the development of missile defense by the United States will weaken China's nuclear retaliation capability. At the 10th Review Conference of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons in August 2022, Chinese Ambassador for Disarmament, Li Song, called for the United States to abandon the development and deployment of a global missile defense system, not seek to deploy land-based intermediate missiles in the Asia Pacific and Europe, abolish nuclear protection umbrellas and nuclear sharing policies, and withdraw all nuclear weapons deployed abroad from its own country
Since the 1990s, China has been using anti nuclear proliferation issues as bargaining chips to influence US foreign policy on issues such as arms sales in Taiwan and the Dalai Lama.  
Peters believes that China may propose to allow the United States to make concessions in its partnership with countries and regions such as Japan, South Korea, India, Australia, and Taiwan (which China sees as a quasi security defense relationship). In addition, he believes that China may try to persuade the United States to reduce long-range precision strike firepower (such as anti-ship missiles or ground cruise missiles).
Peters believes that the two sides may reach some agreement on sharing some data and establishing a crisis management hotline, but he is concerned that this may only be a unilateral sharing by the United States, which would harm its interests.
He told VOA, "Of course I don't object to hotline calls. I don't object to negotiations. I'm a bit concerned about data exchange because these data exchanges have always been unilateral. What I mean is that the United States provides its own position, they provide documents, and Americans often receive criticism of what Americans share with China instead of Chinese documents or positions
He also believes that the United States will not have any real opportunity to reach a treaty based nuclear arms control agreement with China. "The differences are too great, and the interests are inconsistent. Even if the two sides sign the agreement in some way, it still needs to be approved by the US Senate, which I think is almost impossible. There won't be enough senators in Congress willing to approve the treaty

The United States and China have also had nuclear talks before
The United States and China attempted to engage in intergovernmental strategic dialogue on nuclear affairs during the Obama administration, but it ended later and never resumed. The two countries have never established a nuclear arms control relationship.
The most important unofficial dialogue mechanism between the two sides, which involves government officials in their private capacity and private individuals, was suspended in 2020. The United States also does not have a nuclear hotline to contact Beijing. The collapse of fixed dialogue channels has deepened the security dilemma between the United States and China in the nuclear field, greatly increasing the risk of misjudgment.
Peters from the Heritage Foundation oversaw the US Department of Defense's One Half and Two Track Strategic Dialogue with allies and partners from 2019 to 2020, and participated in the development of the New START and the US Nuclear Posture Assessment during the first Obama administration. He said that the unofficial dialogues funded by the US Department of Defense have had any results.
He said, "We will talk about the US nuclear posture and strategic thinking, the US response to potential crises and conflicts, and the only reward we receive is China's criticism of the US stance. We rarely learn anything about China's nuclear strategy, nuclear declaration policies or nuclear posture, or crisis management
Peters also said that the representatives sent by both sides are not equal. He said that the United States will send very high-level representatives to attend the meeting, such as retired ambassadors, deputy ministers, and four-star generals as the chief representatives, but China will send young officers in their thirties who are equivalent to lieutenant colonels to sit down and have equal talks with former four-star generals.
Even so, China often breaks its agreed meeting plans. Peters mentioned that three weeks before the US representative went to Beijing, China suddenly refused to meet under the pretext that the United States was funding democratic protests in Hong Kong. We have already paid, booked hotel rooms and conference rooms, bought air tickets, and so on. China told us, 'You cannot enter China'.
He said that this was also part of the reason why the United States decided to terminate track one and a half and track two dialogues with China in 2020 (before the outbreak of the COVID-19 epidemic).
Although the US has always hoped to extend the nuclear dialogue to the official level, China has taken a cautious attitude towards this, such as insisting on refusing to allow the predecessor of the Chinese rocket army, the Second Artillery Force, to participate in more direct military strategic nuclear dialogue. Both sides also lack consensus on some basic nuclear terms, such as China initially not liking the term "deterrence" and claiming that it has always been related to imperialist blackmail and aggression.
China is not interested in participating in multilateral nuclear arms control
US National Security Advisor Jack Sullivan proposed to negotiate nuclear arms control issues with China and Russia "without preconditions" during a speech at the Arms Control Association in June this year. Sullivan stated that a multinational participation mechanism could be established to allow China and the other four permanent members of the United Nations Security Council to inform each other of missile test launches, and to establish "crisis communication" channels between these countries to discuss nuclear theory, policies, and expenses.
Peters, the Traditional Foundation, stated that the Biden administration urgently wants China to engage in nuclear arms control discussions, which may give China more leverage. He said, "When I think about how the United States is doing its best to persuade China to engage in arms control discussions, the word 'desperation' comes to mind. This actually gives China more chips
Peters pointed out that in retrospect, China has never been interested in participating in treaty based nuclear arms control, The Nuclear Non Proliferation Treaty is basically a universal treaty that has not been signed by North Korea, Israel, India, and Pakistan. It basically means that France, the United Kingdom, Russia, the United States, and China can all possess nuclear weapons. In addition, China has not participated in any form of treaty based nuclear arms control, has not participated in nuclear arms control measures in the 1970s, 1980s, or 1990s, and is not Part of the Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty
He said that China also does not care about the nuclear policy direction of the permanent members of the United Nations Security Council (P5), as the nuclear arsenals of Britain and France are not closely related to the situation in East Asia.
Sinm from the Norwegian Institute of Defense, China still has strong and persistent doubts about (nuclear) arms control. He believes that China's opposition to nuclear arms control is related to the fact that the nuclear arsenals of the United States and Russia are much larger.
He said, "Many people in China are deeply skeptical of the intentions of the United States, believing that the real purpose of the United States naming China to join is to shake the pot or try to lock in their nuclear advantage. Many even see military control as a potential trap
China has repeatedly stated its unwillingness to participate in the "trilateral arms control negotiations between China, the United States, and Russia". In 2020, Fu Cong, then Director of the Arms Control Department of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, stated in a media interview that the so-called trilateral arms control negotiations proposed by the United States were creating excuses for itself to break free from treaty constraints and seek absolute strategic advantage. He said, "China's nuclear power is completely different from that of the United States and Russia... If the United States is willing to reduce its own nuclear power to China's level, China is willing to participate in international nuclear disarmament negotiations, but this may not happen in the foreseeable future.
According to the Federation of American Scientists, the United States currently has a stockpile of approximately 3700 nuclear warheads and has deployed over 1400 strategic nuclear warheads. Russia has a stockpile of over 4400 nuclear warheads and has deployed over 1500.
Chinese representative Sun Xiaobo, who participated in this nuclear dialogue, spoke at the United Nations General Assembly on October 5th, stating that "the policy of not being the first to use nuclear weapons should be universally implemented", and nuclear disarmament should continue to follow the principles of "fairness, reasonableness, gradual reduction, and downward balance". He also criticized "some countries" for pursuing absolute military advantage and accelerating the construction of a "technological iron curtain".

Peters from the Traditional Foundation is pessimistic, saying, "Personally, I believe we are entering a long new era where nuclear arms control treaties used to curb the growth of nuclear weapons will become history